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NOTES
CALIFORNIA v. KLEPPE: WHO REGULATES
AIR QUALITY OVER THE OUTER
CONTINENTIAL SHELF?
The rising cost of imported oil and a worsening balance of trade deficit
have prompted efforts to increase domestic petroleum production. Due to
its immense size, one of the most promising sources of domestic oil and gas
is the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).' The federal government, however,
does not allow unregulated exploration and development of OCS re-
sources. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 19532 established both
jurisdiction and control of the OCS in the federal government3 and au-
thorized the Secretary of Interior (Secretary) to supervise OCS mineral de-
velopment.4 Recognizing the need to balance energy development with
the protection of the human, marine, and coastal environments, Congress,
in 1978, amended the 1953 Act.5 In addition to providing authority over
1. In 1974, for example, the total recoverable reserves from the OCS were estimated as
high as 200 to 400 million barrels of oil and 1,000 to 2,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, I OCS OIL AND GAS - AN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT 20-21 (1974), cited in Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Conti-
nental Shef Mineral Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1107 n.3 (1976). The total area of
the OCS is about one-third the size of the continental United States. The inner boundary of
the shelf begins three geographical miles from the adjacent state's coastline, corresponding
with the outer boundary of the state's coastal zone. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). The outer boundary of the OCS is less precise, extending sea-
ward to the limit of the nation's ability to utilize its resources. So long as this is the test
governing national sovereignty, the limits of national jurisdiction over the OCS are those of
technological capacity rather than fixed geographical boundaries. See Breeden, supra, at
1107 n.2.
2. Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp.
1979)). See notes 24-29 and accompanying text infra.
3. Ch. 345, §§ 3-4, 67 Stat. 463 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332-1333
(West Supp. 1979)).
4. Ch. 345, § 5, 67 Stat. 464 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp.
1979)).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1979)).
The 1978 Amendments more specifically define the Secretary's authority to promulgate rules
and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of the Act. Between 1953 and 1978,
there was only one limited amendment to the Act, The Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (1974) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976)), requiring state laws
applicable to OCS activities to be continually updated. The passage of the 1978 Amend-
ments was preceded by the creation in 1975 of the Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer
Continental Shelf, which in turn resulted from public concern over the Department of Inte-
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the supervision and cancellation of leases, the amendments authorize the
Secretary to prescribe regulations to ensure a lessee's compliance with the
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) pursuant to the Federal
Clean Air Act (CAA).6 While the Secretary is authorized to issue such
regulations for compliance with the CAA, the amendments are silent on
the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which ad-
ministers the Act.7 Nevertheless, the EPA recently claimed jurisdiction
over OCS activities affecting states' air quality on the basis of the 1953
Act's extension of federal law to the OCS.8 Thus, the EPA's reliance on
the 1953 Act, aided by some conflicting legislative history of the subse-
quently passed 1978 Amendments,9 eventually led to a jurisdictional con-
flict between EPA and certain lessees under Interior's regulatory scheme.
The conflict arose over Interior's approval, in July, 1976, of Exxon's ap-
plication to proceed with an offshore storage and treatment facility
(OS&T) off the coast of Santa Barbara, California.' ° On April 18, 1978,
the EPA published a final determination in the Federal Register interpret-
ing the federal jurisdictional grant of the 1953 OCS Lands Act as permit-
ting it to apply certain provisions of the Clean Air Act to Exxon's OS&T. I
Thus, in order to complete the facility, Exxon was not only required to
comply with Interior's leasing regulations but was further instructed to ob-
tain air permits from the EPA.
rior's accelerated OCS leasing schedule under the general authority of the 1953 Act. It was
felt by most that the Act, then 23 years old, was in need of modernization. See H.R. REP
No. 95-590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450,
1463.
6. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(2), (8) (West Supp. 1979). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7401 (1976), is discussed at notes 30-52 and accompanying text infra. The provision in the
1978 Amendments for compliance with NAAQS only applies to the extent that an activity
significantly affects a state's air quality. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(8) (West Supp. 1979).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1979).
8. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,397 (1978).
9. Although the 1978 Amendments passed the House on February 2, 1978, the bill did
not become law until September 18, 1978. See H.R. 1614, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
REC. H556-622 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978). In addition to that portion of the 1953 OCS Lands
Act extending federal law to the OCS, a subsequently issued conference committee report
accompanying the 1978 Amendments contained language indicating that present EPA au-
thority to apply and enforce the CAA was not intended to be affected. H.R. REP. No. 95-
1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1674, 1685.
10. The OS&T is a converted tanker with processing equipment located on its deck. It
is to be moored to a Single Anchor Leg Mooring System (SALM) and will provide equip-
ment for crude oil dehydration and sweetening, water treating, and power generation for the
OS&T itself and for Platform Hondo, the facility which will exploit and produce the crude
oil to be refined at the OS&T. See 43 Fed. Reg. 16,393-94 (1978).
11. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,393 (1978).
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Exxon and several other oil companies sought review of the EPA's rul-
ing by moving to file a counterclaim in a pending district court suit
brought by California to challenge Interior's original approval of the
OS&T. The district judge, believing that the issue should be resolved in
the court of appeals as provided in the CAA, denied the motions.' 2 In
reviewing the district court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in Calfornia v. Kleppe,' 3 ruled that neither the clear
statutory language nor the legislative history of the 1978 Amendments sup-
ported duplicate jurisdiction over the OCS.14 Judge Wallace, writing for
the three-judge panel, held that the language of the amendments clearly
granted authority to promulgate air regulations over the OCS to the Secre-
tary of Interior. 5 Moreover, since the court found EPA authority over
OCS air quality to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme, it reasoned
that judicial review under the OCS Lands Act in the district courts alone
was contemplated.' 6 This note will examine the Kleppe decision in light of
the legislation affecting the OCS, especially those portions creating the
controversy between Exxon and EPA. An analysis of the reasoning behind
the Ninth Circuit's ruling will demonstrate that the opinion fails to resolve
some important issues raised by the controversy. Nevertheless, the result
reached is sound and will promote more effective regulation over the OCS.
I. THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF: "THE CAST OF REGULATORY
CHARACTERS"
A. State versus Federal Ownership
Between the American Revolution and World War II, many coastal
states claimed jurisdiction over submerged lands from the coast outward to
the three-mile limit and beyond.' 7 This practice was tacitly approved by
the federal government, but, as resources and revenues grew in impor-
tance, its position changed. In 1945, President Truman issued a proclama-
tion asserting federal jurisdiction over shelf areas beyond the three-mile
limit.'" Two years later, in United States v. California, the Supreme Court
held that the federal government, not California, had control over the
three-mile territorial sea.' 9 Incidental to this control was full dominion
12. For the procedural history of the case, see note 104 infra.
13. 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979).
14. Id at 1193, 1198.
15. Id at 1193.
16. Id at 1192.
17. See Breeden, supra note 1, at 1111.
18. Policy of the United States with Respect to Natural Resources of Subsoil and Sea-
bed of the Continental Shelf, Exec. Order No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
19. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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over the resources of the soil under that area, including oil.2° In response
to this and other decisions,2 ' Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act
of 1953,22 granting ownership of the seabed and its minerals to the coastal
states within the three-mile territorial sea. Nevertheless, since Congress
granted to the states only "lands beneath navigable waters," jurisdiction
and control of the water and air space over the seabed of the territorial sea
was retained by the federal government.23
B. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Jurisdiction and control of the OCS was not asserted by the federal gov-
ernment until the passage of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of
1953.24 The OCS was defined as all submerged lands under American ju-
risdiction lying seaward of those areas granted to the states under the Sub-
merged Lands Act.25 The OCS Lands Act provided that federal laws
would apply to the OCS as if it were an area of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion within a state.26 The Secretary of Interior was empowered to grant oil
and gas leases on the OCS to the highest responsible qualified bidder.27
The Secretary was also given responsibility to promulgate rules and regu-
20. Id at 38-39.
21. The California case was followed by actions against other states with similar results.
See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S.
699 (1950). The Court's reasoning in these cases is the subject of some controversy. The
basis for the ruling was the federal government's obligation to defend the territorial sea in
time of war. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947). But the federal government
would also be obligated to defend the land mass of the states in the event of war. Federal
control over an entire state has yet to be established on the basis of this defense role. See
Breeden, supra note 1, at 1111 n.17.
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976). This Act was viewed as a congressional response to the
decisions upholding federal control of the territorial sea. See note 21 supra; Breeden, supra
note l, at 1111.
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1976).
24. Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp.
1979)).
25. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976). See notes 1, 22 supra.
26. Ch. 345, § 4(a)(1), 67 Stat. 464 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1979)).
27. Ch. 345, § 8, 67 Stat. 466 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West Supp.
1979)). The Secretary is also authorized to grant sulphur leases as well as leases of "any
mineral other than oil, gas and sulphur ... ." Id Within the Department of Interior, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers the leasing provisions of the OCS Lands
Act, while the United States Geological Survey (USGS) has primary responsibility within
the Department for overseeing the development of a tract once it has been leased. See H.R.




lations to prevent waste and conserve the natural resources of the OCS.2 8
The 1953 Act also provided that jurisdiction of controversies arising out of
operations on the OCS should be in the United States district courts.29
C The Clean Air Act
In 1964, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA)3° to provide techni-
cal and financial assistance to state and local governments in their efforts
to control air pollution 31 and to encourage and assist the development of
regional air pollution control programs.32 The CAA replaced existing en-
vironmental law33 by explicitly delineating and strengthening the author-
ity of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare with respect to its
activities in air pollution research, training, and demonstration pro-
grams.34
In 1970, Congress extensively amended the CAA 31 and transferred the
responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the Act by creating the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).36 The EPA Administrator was
directed to establish primary and secondary national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS). Primary NAAQS are those which the Administrator
deems necessary to protect the public health, while secondary NAAQS are
generally more stringent standards designed to protect the public wel-
fare.37 Subsequently, the EPA promulgated NAAQS for each air pollu-
tant for which air quality criteria had been issued prior to January 31,
1971.38
28. Ch. 345, § 5(a), 67 Stat. 465 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West
Supp. 1979)).
29. Ch. 345, § 4(b), 67 Stat. 464 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1979)). Proceedings with respect to any such controversy can be instituted "in
the judicial district in which any defendant resides or may be found, or in the judicial dis-
trict of the adjacent State nearest the place where the cause of action arose." Id
30. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7462
(West Supp. 1979)).
31. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § l(b), 77 Stat. 393 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §
7401(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
32. Id
33. The CAA replaced the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322
(1955) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979)).
34. For example, the Secretary of HEW was directed by the CAA to establish a national
research and development program for the prevention and control of air pollution. Clean
Air Act § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 394 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §
7403(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
35. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current
version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979)).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7602(a) (West Supp. 1979).
37. Id § 7409(b).
38. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1 to .11 (1978). These pollutants included sulfur dioxide, par-
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1 The State Implementation Plan
In addition to requiring the establishment of NAAQS, the 1970 Clean
Air Amendments directed the states to devise a plan, known as the state
implementation plan (SIP), containing measures necessary to ensure at-
tainment and maintenance of the EPA-promulgated NAAQS.3 9 Approval
by the Administrator is required if the plan is found to provide for timely
attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS and otherwise comports with
the Act's requirements.4" If, however, the Administrator determines that
any portions of the SIP fail to comply with the Act's provisions, the Ad-
ministrator must disapprove those portions and promulgate regulations
ensuring compliance with the Act.4
For the purpose of developing and carrying out the SIP's, the 1970
Amendments divide each state into air quality control regions. The state
may further divide the area into smaller regions with the approval of the
Administrator.42 A region is then classified as an "attainment area" or
"nonattainment area" depending on whether it meets the NAAQS.43
2. New Source Review
The 1970 Amendments further provide the states with authority to pro-
mulgate new source review (NSR) regulations.' For purposes of the
CAA, new sources include constructions or modifications of any stationary
ticulate matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen di-
oxide. Id
39. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
40. ld § 7410(a)(2). Other requirements are that the SIP: (1) include emission limita-
tions, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations; (2) provide for estab-
lishment and operation of appropriate devices for monitoring air quality; (3) establish a
program to provide for enforcement of emission limitations, including a permit program; (4)
contain provisions prohibiting any stationary source from interfering with attainment and
maintenance of NAAQS; (5) provide for adequate personnel, funding, and authority to
carry out the SIP; and (6) provide for periodic testing and inspecting of motor vehicles to
enforce compliance with emission standards. Id § 7410(a)(2). For a discussion of SIP's and
their enforcement, see Comment, State Implementation Plans And Air Quality Enforcement,
4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 595 (1975).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979). If a state submits no air quality plan or
an inadequate plan, the Administrator is required to promulgate an implementation plan for
the state. The Administrator may not order the state to draft a plan according to his specifi-
cations. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 422 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7407(b) (West Supp. 1979).
43. Thus, a region may be an attainment area for primary NAAQS, and also a nonat-
tainment area for the more stringent secondary NAAQS. The Clean Air Act requires sepa-
rate plans for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of primary and secondary
NAAQS. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(c) (West Supp. 1979).
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source commenced after the publication of the NSR regulations.45 While
the Administrator establishes standards of performance for new sources,46
the states may submit procedures for implementing and enforcing the stan-
dards.47 This provision permits the states to analyze the impact of emis-
sions upon the ambient air prior to the construction of new sources.
However, if a state fails to submit a procedure that satisfies the Adminis-
trator, new regulations or modifications of those submitted may be pre-
scribed.48
3. Prevention of Significant Deterioration
While the new source review provision applies to nonattainment areas,
the 1970 Amendments provide for a separate review process for attainment
areas. This is intended to prevent significant deterioration of already clean
air by ensuring that levels of a given pollutant in the ambient air are not
increased by more than a certain amount.49 Prevention of significant dete-
rioration (PSD) regulations prohibit the construction of any major emit-
ting facility5" after August 7, 19775' unless the EPA has issued an air
permit limiting emissions to conform with the requirements of the Act. 2
45. Id § 7411(a)(2).
46. Id § 741 l(b)(l)(B). In accordance with this provision, the Administrator published
new source performance standards for each category of sources to be regulated. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. §§ 60.1 to .344 (1978). These sources included fossil-fueled stream generators, incin-
erators, cement plants, nitric acid plants, petroleum refineries, and smelters. Id
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(c) (West Supp. 1979). For a further discussion of NSR regula-
tions, see Comment, Direct Federal Controls New Source Performance Standards and Haz-
ardous Emissions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 645 (1975).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979). This authority is similar to that
allowing the Administrator to disapprove and amend a SIP. See note 41 and accompanying
text supra.
49. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7470-7479 (West Supp. 1979).
50. The term "major emitting facility" is defined in the Act as a source that emits or has
the potential to emit 100 or more tons per year of any air pollutant from various sources.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7479(1) (West Supp. 1979). This definition is currently being revised
pursuant to a recent court order. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, [1979] 13 E.R.C. 1225
(BNA). As proposed, the new definition provides that the words "potential to emit" would
mean "the capability at maximum capacity to emit a pollutant after the application of air
pollution control equipment." Thus, whether a source is major would depend on the air
pollution equipment incorporated into its design. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51,924, 51,929 (1979).
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a) (West Supp. 1979). This date was established in the 1977
Amendments to the Act. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
52. To obtain the permit, the owner or operator must demonstrate, among other things,
that emissions from the construction or operation of the facility will not cause air pollution
in excess of any "(A) maximum allowable increase or maximum allowable concentration for
any pollutant in any area to which this part applies more than one time per year, (B) na-
tional ambient air quality standard in any air quality control region, or (C) any other appli-
cable emission standard or standard of performance under this chapter." 42 U.S.C.A. §
7475(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979). PSD regulations were originally promulgated in December,
1980]
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Thus, the CAA requires the EPA to establish primary and secondary
NAAQS and directs the states to submit SIP's to provide for attainment
and maintenance of the NAAQS. In addition, the EPA has discretion to
amend the SIP's in order to bring them into conformance with the Act.
The same concerns that prompted Congress to enact the CAA also gave
rise to other measures to protect the environment. One of these measures
was designed to protect the nation's coastal zone.
D. The Coastal Zone Management Act
In order to promote the national interest in protecting and developing
the coastal zone of the United States, Congress enacted the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).5 3 The CZMA encourages statewide
coastal management programs by authorizing the use of federal resources,
both technical and financial, to foster their creation. Through the Depart-
ment of Commerce, direct grants are administered to assist states in devel-
oping a coastal zone management plan (CZMP).54 Once the CZMP is
approved by the Secretary of Commerce, operating assistance is also pro-
vided." Prior to approval of a CZMP, the Secretary must find that it satis-
fies several conditions, including adequate consideration of the national
interest in federal facilities. 6 Although a state's participation in the pro-
gram is voluntary, the CZMA incorporates an additional incentive: once a
state's CZMP is approved, all federal activities "directly affecting" the
1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974) in response to a court order. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,
344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), a'd, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). Pursuant to the 1977 Amend-
ments to the Act, the EPA revised implementing regulations for PSD requirements. 43 Fed.
Reg. 26,380 (1978). These regulations were automatically incorporated into the California
SIP. 40 C.F.R. § 52.270 (1978).
53. Pub. L. No. 92-583; 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976)).
The precise definition of the coastal zone is the subject of much controversy. Most authori-
ties agree that the outer boundary of the zone is a line three geographical miles from the
adjacent state's coastline, coinciding with the inner boundary of the OCS. See 43 U.S.C. §
1312 (1976); note 1 supra. Conflict occurs over the inner boundary of the coastal zone. The
CZMA states that "[t]he zone extends inland from the shorelines only to the extent necessary
to control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on coastal
waters." Pub. L. No. 92-583, § 304(a), 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
1453(1) (1976)). Problems arise in defining uses of land having "direct and significant im-
pact on coastal waters." See Breeden, supra note 1, at 1130 n.l14.
54. Pub. L. No. 92-583, § 305, 86 Stat. 1282 (1972) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1454
(1976)).
55. Pub. L. No. 92-583, § 306, 86 Stat. 1283 (1972) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1455
(1976)). The Secretary of Commerce exercises CZMA authority through the Office of
Coastal Zone Management and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).




state's coastal zone must be consistent with the plan.57
As originally enacted, the CZMA did not address the question of
whether oil and gas leases issued pursuant to the 1953 OCS Lands Act
constituted an activity affecting the coastal zone of a state.58 Conse-
quently, Congress adopted amendments to the' CZMA in 1976," specifi-
cally applying the consistency requirements of the Act to oil and gas
exploration, development, and production activities on the OCS.6° More-
over, the 1976 Amendments require the Secretary of Commerce to find
that the plan adequately considers the national interest in planning and
siting energy facilities prior to granting final approval.6 ' Thus, while the
state must consider the nation's energy interests in developing its CZMP,
oil and gas lessees must conform their OCS activities with the plan once it
is approved. Since approval of a CZMP (and hence a finding that the
energy interests are considered) must precede any application of the con-
sistency requirements, protection of the national interest seems assured.62
The 1976 Amendments also contain specific enforcement provisions ap-
plicable to OCS activities. 63 Persons submitting an exploration plan or a
57. Pub. L. No. 92-583, § 307(c), 86 Stat. 1283 (1972) (current version at 16 U.S.C.
§1456(c) (1976)). For an extensive discussion of the consistency requirement and whether it
is tantamount to state control over federal activities, see Rubin, The Role of the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 in the Development of Oil and Gasfrom the Outer Continental She!f,
8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 399, 407-28 (1975). For a general discussion of the consistency
provision, see Shaffer, OCS Development and the Consistency Provisions of the Coastal Zone
Management Act - 4 Legal and Policy Analysis, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 595 (1977).
58. The broadest interpretation of the consistency requirement is that it applies to activ-
ities outside the coastal zone that affect land or water uses in the coastal zone. Under this
interpretation, if a state could demonstrate that an "exploratory drilling" was an activity
affecting its coastal zone and that such activity was inconsistent with its CZMP, it could
prevent the government from issuing the exploration permit. See Rubin, supra note 57, at
412.
59. Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat.
1013 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976)).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976).
61. Id § 1455(c)(8). This language adds specificity to the requirement that the plan
adequately consider the national interest in other than local facilities. See note 56 and ac-
companying text supra.
62. The exact meaning of the term "adequately consider the national interest" is cur-
rently being litigated in the federal courts in California. The district court rejected the posi-
tion that the CZMA consistency provisions require the state to create a "zoning map" which
would eliminate the need for lessees to consult with the state regarding activities in or affect-
ing its coastal zone. American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
Instead, the court held that affirmative accommodation of energy facilities is not a quidpro
quo for approval of a CZMP. Id at 924. The appeal is now pending before the Ninth
Circuit. No. 77-3375 (9th Cir. 1978).
63. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976). The original consistency provisions contained
no enforcement provisions. They were general in nature, providing that federal activities or
projects undertaken by a federal agency which directly affected the coastal zone of a state
1980]
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development and production plan to the Secretary of Interior under the
OCS Lands Act must certify to the affected state that each activity under
the plan is consistent with the state's CZMP. If the state fails to concur
with or object to the certification within six months after receipt, its ap-
proval is conclusively presumed.64 Additionally, if the state objects and
such objection is not overridden by the Secretary of Commerce, 65 the ap-
plicant must submit a new or amended plan, subject to an abbreviated
review process of three months.66
Thus, while the 1953 OCS Lands Act regulates only those activities con-
ducted on the OCS as that area is defined in the Act,67 the CZMA as
amended reaches those activities conducted in the coastal zone and also
those conducted on the OCS to the extent they affect the coastal zone.68 In
this respect, the CZMA is broader in scope than the OCS Lands Act.
E The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
In 1978, Congress amended the 1953 OCS Lands Act extensively in or-
der to expedite the exploitation and development of the OCS.6 9 The 1978
Amendments were designed to give states more input into decisions con-
cerning OCS development.7° The Secretary is prohibited from granting
licenses or permits for activities affecting a state's coastal zone unless the
consistency provisions of the CZMA are met.7 ' The amendments further
provide for coordination mechanisms between federal and state govern-
must be consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the CZMP. 16 U.S.C. §
1456(c)(1), (2) (1976).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1976). This provision was slightly altered by the 1978
Amendments to the OCS Lands Act. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 504, 92 Stat. 693 (1978) (codified
at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1979)). The state now has three months after
receipt of the certification to notify the lessee of the status of review, citing reasons for fur-
ther delay in issuing a final decision. It then has three additional months to issue a final
decision. If either of these requirements is not complied with, the state's concurrence is
conclusively presumed.
65. The Secretary of Commerce may find that the proposed activity is consistent with
the objectives of the CZMA or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security. 16
U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1976). It is arguable, therefore, that the nation's current energy crisis
might allow the invocation of the "national security" provision, but there is no precedent for
such action to date. See Rubin, supra note 57, at 428.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976).
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). See note I supra.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (1976). See note 53 supra.
69. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356 (West
Supp. 1979)). For a discussion of the original Act, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text
supra.
70. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(4), (5) (West Supp. 1979).
71. Id § 1340(c)(2). This provision is applicable only to those states with an approved
CZMP. See notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
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ments. Explicit authority is granted for cooperative agreements between
the Secretary and affected states for information sharing, expert advice,
planning, and enforcement. 2 Prior to leasing any lands within three miles
of the seaward boundary of a state's territorial sea, the Secretary must pro-
vide information to its governor. Additionally, the state must be offered
the opportunity to enter an arrangement for the special leasing of that area
which might contain a geological structure common to both federal and
state lands.73
As in the 1953 Act, the Secretary is required to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of the amendments, but the scope of
such regulations is more specifically defined.7 ' The most significant
change with respect to controlling air pollution on the OCS is the provi-
sion requiring regulations for compliance with the NAAQS, established
pursuant to the Clean Air Act,75 to the extent that OCS activities signifi-
cantly affect the air quality of any state. 76 Thus, the NAAQS, established
by the EPA, must be met on the OCS. However, while the 1978 Amend-
ments increased the Secretary's responsibility to regulate air quality on the
OCS, there was no expression of any corresponding decrease in the EPA's
authority. Indeed, the Act specifically provides that the Administrator's
authority to protect the environment shall not be affected by the amend-
ments.77
72. Id § 1345(e).
73. Id § 1337(g). In the event of a refusal by the governor of the affected state, the
Secretary may proceed with the leasing but all bonuses, royalties, and other revenues are to
be placed in an escrow fund until geological information allows the parties to determine the
proper allocation of payments. Id § 133 7(g)(4). See H.R. REP. No. 95-590, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 50, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1456 [hereinafter cited as
Legislative History].
74. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West Supp. 1979).
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West Supp. 1979). See notes 30-52 and accompanying text
supra.
76. The provision requires that
[t]he regulations prescribed by the secretary under this subsection shall include, but
not be limited to, provisions ... (8) for compliance with the national ambient air
quality standards pursuant to the Clean Air Act, to the extent that activities author-
ized under this subsection significantly affect the air quality of any State.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West Supp. 1979).
77. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1347(d) (West Supp. 1979). The EPA's role in OCS activities involve
its being consulted on all studies and reviews under the National Environmental Protection
Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976), and in setting and enforcing discharge levels of pollu-
tants. See Legislative History, supra note 73, at 1567. The NEPA established the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to issue guidelines for federal agencies on compliance
with the Act. See 36 Fed. Reg. 7723 (1971). The object of the NEPA and the guidelines was
to inject an appropriate and careful consideration of environmental aspects of proposed ac-
tion into agency decisionmaking processes. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v.
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Additionally, the 1978 amendments retain provisions of the original Act
applying state law only to the extent that it is applicable and not inconsis-
tent with the Act.78 Moreover, under the amendments, state law is not to
be interpreted as a basis for claiming jurisdiction for any state for any
purpose over the OCS.7 9 Finally, the 1978 Amendments retain the provi-
sion, with some modifications, that federal law is to apply to the OCS as if
it were an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction located within a state.8 0
II. DISPUTED JURISDICTION OVER OCS AIR QUALITY
In February, 1968, pursuant to authority under the OCS Lands Act,
8 1
the Secretary of Interior offered oil and gas leases in the Santa Barbara
Channel for competitive bidding. Seventeen leases were subsequently ag-
gregated to form the Santa Ynez Unit.82 This unit was approved by the
United States Geological Survey (USGS) on November 12, 1970.83 The
holders of the leases were Exxon Corporation, Chevron U.S.A., Inc., and
Shell Oil Company. Exxon was designated the operator of the unit, and in
1971 it submitted a plan detailing the facilities to be installed to develop
the unit.84 The plan provided for a facility known as the Hondo Platform
to be constructed for purposes of exploration and production and proposed
United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Thus, if EPA finds any environmental
impact statement prepared by BLM pursuant to the OCS leasing program unsatisfactory, it
can exercise a limited protest function and refer the matter to the CEQ. The EPA is also
responsible for issuing national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permits
pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972. 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(1976). That Act controls the discharges of pollutants into navigable waters, an issue not
explored in this note.
78. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
79. Id § 1333(a)(3). Thus, it would seem that the only way for a state to interfere with
the OCS leasing program would be through the consistency requirements of the CZMA.
See notes 57-68 and accompanying text supra.
80. The provision mandates that:
[t]he Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States
are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all
artificial islands, and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the sea-
bed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or
producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other than
a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources, to the same extent
as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
located within a State. ...
43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
81. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
82. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(4) (West Supp. 1979) (authorizing unitization agree-
ments).
83. See note 26 supra.
84. See Brief for Appellees at 20, California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as EPA Brief].
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two alternatives to process and transport the oil produced by the platform.
The preferred alternative involved the use of an onshore facility which
would receive crude oil through a subsea pipeline and process and store it
for shipment to refineries via tankers. The second alternative, to be
adopted only if Exxon was unable to obtain permission from the State of
California for the onshore facility, entailed the construction of an offshore
storage and treatment facility (OS&T) and the subsequent transfer of oil to
tankers at the OS&T. The OS&T, a converted tanker with processing
equipment located on its deck, would be moored 3.2 miles from shore,
outside state jurisdiction. 5
Pursuant to the mandate provided by the National Environmental Pro-
tection Act (NEPA),a6 a lengthy environmental impact statement (EIS)
was prepared by Interior through the Bureau of Land Management. In
1974, Interior approved Exxon's plan of development for the unit, includ-
ing the two alternatives. Approval of the OS&T was conditioned on Ex-
xon's using good faith efforts to obtain permission from appropriate state
agencies to construct and operate the onshore facility under reasonable
terms and conditions.
On March 3, 1976, the California Coastal Commission (CCC)17 ap-
proved Exxon's permit application for the onshore terminal but sought to
condition its approval by (1) approving construction and operation of the
marine loading terminal only for a temporary period of five years with the
possibility of renewal and (2) subjecting the approval to the State Public
Utilities Commission's determination whether Exxon should be required
to build a pipeline from the facility to refineries in Los Angeles or any
other area."8 Unable to reach agreement with the CCC regarding these
conditions, Exxon abandoned its attempt to obtain permission for the on-
shore facility and in July, 1976, Interior determined that the conditions
imposed by the CCC were not reasonable.8 9 Consequently, Exxon was
85. See 43 Fed. Reg. 16,394 (1978); note 10 supra.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976). See note 77 supra.
87. The CCC was established pursuant to the California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (1977). The Act created a permanent coastal management pro-
gram enabling the state to qualify for federal grants under the CZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1451
(1976). See notes 53-68 and accompanying text supra.
88. The decision of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) would be based on its own
independent determination of the economic feasibility of the pipeline and the refinery ca-
pacity. See Shaffer, supra note 57, at 595-98.
89. Interior agreed with Exxon that it would not be economically feasible for it to build
the marine loading terminal if the state were only willing to issue a five-year temporary
permit. Additionally, the state PUC would be making business decisions concerning the
pipeline that had been solely within the province of Exxon. See Shaffer, supra note 57, at
597.
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permitted to proceed with the offshore alternative.
In related developments, the EPA reviewed and disapproved certain
portions of the state implementation plan (SIP) submitted by California
pursuant to the Clean Air Act. 9° The most significant of the disapproved
portions were the new source review (NSR)9' provisions for the Santa Bar-
bara and Ventura air pollution control districts (APCD's). The EPA then
promulgated substitute regulations applicable to construction of new and
modified stationary sources within those APCD's.92 The new regulations
provided that no owner or operator of a new or modified stationary source
could commence construction without first obtaining approval from the
EPA.93 That approval was in turn conditioned upon the owner's or opera-
tor's demonstration that the source would not violate the SIP and would
not prevent or interfere with the attainment or maintenance of any na-
tional standard. 94 Additionally, the EPA promulgated regulations for pre-
vention of significant deterioration (PSD)9" that were incorporated into the
California SIP.96 These rules prohibit construction of any source which
emits more than 250 tons of any pollutant per year without a permit.97
Subsequently, on April 18, 1978, the EPA determined that Exxon's
OS&T was subject to review under the NSR and PSD provisions of the
Clean Air Act and EPA's implementing regulations.98 The ruling set forth
the estimated amount of emissions from the OS&T and indicated that they
would exceed NSR and PSD regulations, thus having an adverse impact
on air quality within the adjacent onshore regions. 99 The EPA defended
its ruling by relying upon the provision in the 1953 OCS Lands Act apply-
ing all federal law to the OCS.l°° The EPA thus concluded that the CAA
and its regulatory directives could be applied to the OCS. The OCS Lands
Act also extended applicable and consistent state law to the OCS and pro-
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. 1977). See notes 30-52 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (Supp. 1977); note 48 and accompanying text supra.
93. 40 C.F.R. § 52.233(0(2) (1978).
94. d § 52.233(f(3)(ii).
95. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
96. 40 C.F.R. § 52.270(b) (1978).
97. Id § 52.21.
98. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,393 (1978). See notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra.
99. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,397 (1978). The EPA first expressed its concern over emissions
from the OS&T in a letter dated September 3, 1976, requesting Exxon to submit information
regarding emissions from the facility. EPA Brief, supra note 84, at 23-24.
100. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Ch. 345, § 4, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (current
version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979)). The EPA relied on this provision




vided for their administration by appropriate federal officials.'' Accord-
ingly, the EPA alternatively asserted that the SIP's promulgated pursuant
to the CAA were either federal or state law' °2 within the meaning of the
jurisdictional provisions of the 1953 Act and that the EPA was the appro-
priate enforcement agency. Consequently, the EPA concluded that the
CAA, the SIP's, and regulations promulgated thereunder must apply to all
OCS activities which it determines will have an adverse impact on air
quality over the United States.'0 3 Exxon and Chevron subsequently filed
petitions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seek-
ing review of the EPA determination."
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the case, Interior published a notice
of proposed rulemaking seeking public participation in selecting a proce-
dure for controlling air emissions on the OCS.' °5 On May 10, 1979, the
department announced public hearings and proposed revisions to its regu-
lations for oil and gas and sulphur operations on the OCS.' °6 Although
the proposed rules are designed to ensure that the state's ability to attain
the standards set in the SIP's is not thwarted, they do not adopt all the
provisions of the SIP. As a reason for deviating from EPA's standards,
Interior stated that the Administrator's procedures and criteria were not
entirely applicable to the department's mandate under the 1978 Amend-
ments because OCS sources are external to the onshore areas whose air
101. Ch. 345, § 4(a)(2), 67 Stat. 463 (1953) (current version at 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1979)).
102. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,397 (1978).
103. Id
104. The procedural history of the case is quite complex. The State of California origi-
nally sought review in federal district court of Interior's 1976 decision to allow Exxon to
proceed with the OS&T. California v. Kleppe, No. 76-3406 RMT (C.D. Cal. 1976). As
codefendants in that suit, Exxon, Chevron, and Shell sought review of a later tentative deter-
mination that the OS&T was subject to NSR provisions by attempting to file a counterclaim,
and Exxon moved to join the EPA as an additional counterdefendant. The court denied the
motions, holding that since the EPA's determination was not final, the counterclaim was not
ripe. The court further stated that even if it were ripe, it would be exclusively reviewable in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pursuant to the judicial review of the EPA
determinations under the CAA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Follow-
ing a motion for reconsideration in light of the EPA's final determination of April 18, 1978,
the court recognized the ripeness of the claim but adhered to its previous holding on juris-
diction. Exxon, Chevron, and Shell each appealed from the district court's ruling and, in
addition, Exxon and Chevron filed petitions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit seeking review of the EPA's determination. In an order entered October 31, 1978,
the court of appeals consolidated the appeals of Exxon and Chevron. See EPA Brief, supra
note 84, at 32-35.
105. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,612 (1978).
106. 44 Fed. Reg. 27,448 (1979).
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quality they may affect.'° 7 Thus, while EPA standards and tests provided
some guidance, they were not controlling upon the Secretary.
III. CALIFORNIA v KLEPPE: AN INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 1978
AMENDMENTS
On August 20, 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cali-
fornia v. Kleppe,10 8 resolved the jurisdictional conflict between EPA and
Interior and held that the Department of Interior has exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate air emissions occurring as a result of oil and gas operations on
the OCS. The court cited a portion of the 1978 amendments giving the
Secretary responsibility for promulgating regulations mandating compli-
ance with the NAAQS pursuant to the CAA °9 and held that the plain
meaning of this language was that the Secretary had exclusive authority to
regulate air quality on the OCS." The court observed that under the
EPA's determination, SIP's were the "basic mechanism" for protecting air
quality. "'
Under Interior's proposed rules, the regulatory scheme was designed
"wholly independent" of the SIP's although it relied on EPA criteria to
some extent."' Thus, observing the potential for confusion and its obliga-
tion to construe federal statutes consistently, the court concluded that the
jurisdictional provisions of the Clean Air Act did not apply. 1
3
The court supported its conclusion with the legislative history of the
1978 Amendments. The accompanying House report outlining Interior's
responsibilities with respect to OCS activities made no mention of EPA
jurisdiction. Rather, the report specified that the Secretary was responsible
for OCS air quality control while other federal, state, and local officials
were to have a consultative role." 4 In addition, remarks made by Con-
gressman Murphy, chairman of the Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Con-
tinental Shelf, during the debate expressly indicated that the EPA did not
107. Id. at 27,450.
108. 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(8) (West Supp. 1979). See note 76 and accompanying text
supra.
110. The court supported this reading of the statute by citing to other portions of the
amendments where Congress delineated the specific roles of agencies with potentially over-
lapping responsibilities. 604 F.2d at 1193 n.8.
111. Id. at 1194.
112. Id
113. Id Additionally, the court noted that while Interior's recent action illustrated its
point, it would have reached the same conclusion had the Secretary not issued regulations
since the "potential for conflict would exist in any event." Id 1194 n.9.
114. Id at 1195 n.12. See Legislative History, supra note 73, at 1539.
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have authority to go offshore.' 15
Moreover, the court found the strongest evidence of congressional intent
outside the language of the statute itself in a joint statement of the confer-
ence committee for the OCS Lands Act Amendments.1 6 The report speci-
fied the use of the Secretary's judgment in determining the effect of future
OCS operations onshore and, significantly, placed no apparent limit on the
Secretary's regulatory authority over OCS air quality." 7 The Secretary
was to ensure that OCS activities did not prevent attainment of state air
quality standards if state air quality is "significantly affected" by those ac-
tivities.' 18
While the report of the conference committee did not limit the Secre-
tary's OCS authority, it noted the committee's awareness of the EPA's
April determination and stated that the committee did not intend to affect
"whatever present authority the EPA has in applying and enforcing the
Clean Air Act.""' 9 The EPA relied upon this language and a provision in
the 1978 Amendments indicating Congress' desire not to affect the EPA's
authority to protect the environment in support of its assumption of OCS
responsibilities. 2 ° Since, prior to the amendments, the EPA had exclusive
authority to apply the CAA, it argued that its authority could not now be
diminished. Additionally, the EPA cited the remarks of Senators Muskie
and Jackson that EPA had primary administrative authority over the OCS
activities affecting air quality and that Interior's authority was supplemen-
tary.
12 1
The court, however, was not persuaded by the EPA's arguments. First,
the court found the conference committee's language to be facially neutral
but nevertheless examined EPA's preamendment authority. If the EPA
had no OCS jurisdiction, the committee language reserved no authority at
all, and the language was "mere surplusage."1 22 On the other hand, if the
EPA had OCS authority before the amendments, the language would indi-
cate partially or wholly concurrent authority over the OCS.' 23 Without
115. 604 F.2d at 1195 n.14. The court also quoted from another portion of the House
floor debate when Congressman Murphy confirmed that the Secretary was to "solicit and
give due consideration to the views of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency in developing his regulations." Id at 1195 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H416 (daily
ed. Jan 31, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rogers)).
116. See 604 F.2d at 1196; Legislative History, supra note 72, at 1674, 1684.
117. 604 F.2d at 1196.
118. Id
119. Legislative History, su'pra note 73, at 1685.
120. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1347(d) (West Supp. 1979); EPA Brief, supra note 83, at 57.
121. EPA Brief, supra note 84, at 49, 56, 58.
122. 604 F.2d at 1197.
123. Id
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any assurance that Congress intended to create bureaucratic conflict, the
court was unwilling to insert a new regulatory agency into the "cast of
regulatory characters" on the basis of this uncertain language. 124 Thus,
the court concluded that the language could have no weight in resolving
the jurisdictional issue.
Similarly, the court found the provision in the 1978 Amendments to be
equally unclear in resolving the agency's jurisdiction since its context and
history indicated that it did not arise from any concern over the EPA's
April determination. 125 Finally, the court viewed the remarks of the Sena-
tors, not spoken in debate, as insufficient to form a clear congressional
intent to acknowledge EPA authority over air quality regulation on the
OCS. 12 6 Thus, the court concluded that Congress did not make its intent
clear in the legislative history with respect to EPA authority over OCS air
quality. Such authority, however, would impair or frustrate the authority
clearly provided to the Secretary by the statute. Consequently, the court
held that Congress did not intend such a result and the jurisdictional grant
to the Secretary was controlling. 27 The petitions for review filed under
the Clean Air Act were therefore dismissed since that Act did not apply. 1
28
Since the OCS Lands Act provides for jurisdiction in the federal district
court,' 29 the case was remanded for resolution consistent with the appel-
late court's opinion.'3 °
The immediate result of the decision is that Interior has sole authority to
control air quality emissions over the OCS. To this extent, it is sound and
comports with the legislative intent of eliminating duplicative regulation of
the OCS.' 3' While the result of the decision is a proper one, the court
neglected relevant legislative history in reaching its conclusion. For exam-
124. Id
125. Id at 1197 n.17. The provision also noted that the authority of the Secretaries of
Labor and Transportation was not to be affected in regard to occupational safety and health
and pipeline safety, respectively. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1347(d) (West Supp. 1979).
126. 604 F.2d at 1198. The court, however, did acknowledge that the remarks carried
some weight since Senator Muskie was the "principal author" of the CAA, while Senator
Jackson was both a member of the conference committee and chairman of the committee
that submitted the amendments and report in the Senate. Id See City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 637 (1973).
127. 604 F.2d at 1198.
128. The CAA provides for jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, if the Administrator's action has national scope. If the action is locally or regionally
applicable, then jurisdiction Lies in the court of appeals for the appropriate circuit. 42
U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
129. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). See note 29 and accompanying text
su'pra.
130. See note 104 supra.
131. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (West Supp. 1979).
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pie, the court appeared troubled by the conference committee statement
indicating Congress' awareness of the EPA's present environmental au-
thority.' 32 This matter could have been disposed of more appropriately
had the court more closely examined the scope of the EPA's authority over
the OCS prior to 1978. In addressing this argument, the court ignored
legislative history that effectively refuted the EPA's assumption that it had
authority to regulate the air quality over the OCS prior to the amend-
ments. The legislative history of the amendments suggests that Congress
contemplated no such authority. The EPA's role on the OCS was de-
scribed as consultative, 133 and no mention was made of any authority to
regulate the OCS environment. Arguably then, it was this advisory func-
tion that Congress intended not to disturb by the amendments. Moreover,
in the House report on the amendments, Congress enumerated legislation
applicable to the OCS prior to 1978.' The noticeable absence of the
Clean Air Act from the list lends support to the contention that the EPA
was never vested with authority to apply that Act to the OCS. If the EPA's
authority existed only in the consultative sense discussed above, then the
congressional intent not to disturb that authority is given more realistic
meaning. Such an interpretation would defeat the EPA's argument while
at the same time avoid the court's conclusion that this portion of the legis-
lative history carried no weight.' 35
Additionally, the court did not reach the articulated basis of the EPA's
determination, ie., that the CAA could be applied to the OS&T through
the provision of the amendments extending federal law to the OCS. 136 In
the court of appeals, the EPA chose to rely on this interpretation rather
than the provision directing the Secretary of Interior to issue regulations
for compliance with the CAA. 13' In its ruling, the question of whether the
SIP, the basic mechanism for enforcing the CAA, was state or federal law
132. Legislative History, supra note 73, at 1674, 1684.
133. See Legislative History, supra note 73, at 1467; note 77 and accompanying text
supra.
134. Legislative History, supra note 73, at 1464-65. Specifically, the legislation included:
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 742 (1976); Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1451
(1976); Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976); Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976); Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976).
135. See 604 F.2d at 1197; text accompanying notes 119-24 supra.
136. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(I) (West Supp. 1979). See notes 26, 80, 100 and accompany-
ing text supra.
137. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(8). See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
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was dismissed as irrelevant. 138 Nevertheless, the question does appear to
be relevant, for if the SIP is state law, it applies to the OCS only to the
extent that it is consistent with the Act and other federal laws and regula-
tions.139 Since Exxon's permit to proceed with the OS&T was obtained
under the 1953 OCS Lands Act and Interior's promulgating regulations, 
41
the application of the SIP as state law could be inconsistent with federal
law and therefore precluded. Furthermore, the Act provides that state law
shall never be the basis for claiming jurisdiction on behalf of any state over
the OCS.14 1 Thus, by its own admission, the EPA asserted jurisdiction
over the OCS to protect the ambient air quality over the State of Califor-
nia and therefore did so "on behalf of' that state in violation of the Act.' 42
Moreover, while the Kieppe decision at first glance appears finally to
settle the issue of EPA/Interior duplicative jurisdiction, a closer examina-
tion suggests that it may have left open as many questions as it resolved.
For example, if Interior's regulations allowed a lessee to emit pollutants on
the OCS in excess of a state's SIP, preventing attainment or maintenance
of NAAQS, environmental plaintiffs may bring suit against Interior for
violating the CAA. Kleppe would not be dispositive of such a challenge
since it addressed only the issue of agency jurisdiction. While the court
did compare the EPA's CAA standards with Interior's proposed regula-
tions and noticed Interior's departure from the SIP as its regulatory vehi-
cle, 43 the decision provides no guidance concerning the degree of latitude
afforded Interior in regulating air quality over the OCS. However, since
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,397 (1978).
139. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979). See note 78 and accompanying text
supra. See also Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969) (state law applies
only when not inconsistent with federal law).
140. See notes 81-89 and accompanying text supra.
141. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979). See note 79 and accompanying text
supra.
142. See EPA Brief, supra note 84, at 48. The EPA also asserted that there was a "void"
in federal law since Interior did not promulgate new regulations pursuant to the 1978
Amendments. Id at 58-59. However, Interior had already published guidelines concerning
environmental considerations for OCS leasing, 43 Fed. Reg. 3885 (1978), and Congress
stated that Interior was not required to repromulgate regulations already consistent with the
amendments. See Legislative History, supra note 73, at 1536. Even if there was a "void" in
federal law, the question would still arise as to whether the EPA was the "appropriate"
federal official to fill it. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979). Since the Act
specifically stated that Interior could issue regulations for compliance with the CAA on the
OCS, id § 1334(a)(8), it appears that the Secretrary, not the Administrator, is the "ap-
proprate" official. See Reply Brief of Petitioner and Appellant at 29-30, California v.
Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1978). In addition, Interior has promulgated rules for bring-
ing OCS activities into conformance with the 1978 Amendments. 44 Fed. Reg. 17,448
(1979). See notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra.
143. 604 F.2d at 1194; 44 Fed. Reg. 17,450 (1979).
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the 1978 Amendments instruct Interior to prescribe regulations "for com-
pliance" with the NAAQS pursuant to the CAA,'" it is likely that Con-
gress did not intend Interior to formulate regulations contrary to those
issued by the EPA. Nevertheless, an argument can be made that if Con-
gress had intended the EPA's standards to be inflexibly applied to the OCS
it would not have assigned that task to Interior. This argument, in favor of
a broader mandate to Interior to govern OCS air quality, is consistent with
the statute's purpose; namely, to consolidate all OCS regulatory activities
within Interior to ensure a consistent and uniform approach. 45 Such an
argument is also supported by Interior's assertion in proposing its regula-
tions that "it was necessary" to deviate from the EPA's standards since
"OCS sources are external to the onshore areas whose air quality they may
affect and therefore the EPA procedures and criteria are not entirely appli-
cable to the Department's mandate under the Act."' 46 Thus, if a contro-
versy over the scope of Interior's air quality authority arises, the Kleppe
decision does not provide any immediate answer.
Additionally, it is uncertain whether an environmental plaintiff would
sue in the court of appeals in accordance with the CAA 147 or pursue a
remedy in the district court as provided in the OCS Lands Act. 148 The
Court in California v. Kleppe dispensed with this question by merely say-
ing that since Congress intended the OCS Lands Act to prevail, then its
jurisdictional provisions govern. 49 Thus, in an environmental action
against Interior alleging a violation of the CAA, it is possible that court of
appeals jurisdiction under the CAA will also be available. Finally, if Inte-
rior regulations violated a state's SIP, the state could presumably use the
consistency provisions of the CZMA to block OCS activity. 5° Such inter-
ference would lead to duplicate jurisdiction which, according to the court,
Congress sought to avoid.
One possible solution to these problems has been proposed by one com-
mentator, Richard Breeden,' 5 ' who favors passage of a National Offshore
Policy Act to outline the goals of OCS development, to establish proce-
144. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(8) (West Supp. 1979). See note 76 supra.
145. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (West Supp. 1979).
146. 44 Fed. Reg. 27,450 (1979).
147. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
148. See notes 29, 129, and accompanying text supra.
149. 604 F.2d at 1199. See note 104 supra.
150. See notes 63-68 and accompanying text supra. Additionally, any requirements es-
tablished pursuant to the CAA are incorporated into the state's CZMP. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(f)
(1976). This provision would give the state added leverage in challenging Interior's regula-
tions which violated the SIP.
151. See note 1 supra.
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dures for OCS decisionmaking, and to create a special congressional com-
mittee to review OCS policy.' 52 Alternatively, Breeden favors an
amendment to the Submerged Lands Act 15 3 giving states an adjacent
buffer zone between the coastal zone and the OCS. This amendment
would allow states to control leasing in near-shore areas and would further
the policy of state participation in OCS decisionmaking. 54 This kind of
proposal may ultimately be the appropriate response to avoid the confu-
sion and uncertainty resulting from overlapping jurisdiction.'
55
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the 1978 Amendments in order to balance the coun-
try's need for the expeditious development of its natural resources with the
environmental concerns for the OCS and its adjacent coastal states. To
achieve this balance, it directed the Secretary of Interior to apply the pro-
visions of the Clean Air Act to those activities affecting the coastal areas of
adjacent states. The purpose of this mandate was to facilitate "one stop
shopping" by those involved in the development of resources of the OCS,
thereby expediting the country's independence from foreign oil sources.
Thus, the Secretary of Interior was to be the coordinator of all OCS regu-
lations.
The EPA's claim of jurisdiction and application of SIP's to OCS activi-
ties conflicts with clear congressional intent and would have frustrated In-
terior's execution of OCS leases and thereby discouraged further OCS
development. The Ninth Circuit's decision in California v. Kleppe recog-
nized the clear purpose of the 1978 Amendments and will allow Interior to
execute the OCS leasing program unhindered by conflicting agency direc-
tives. While the ruling avoided some issues, such as whether a SIP is state
152. Breeden, supra note 1, at 1152.
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
154. Breeden, supra note 1, at 1154.
155. See Get Oil Out! Inc. v. Exxon, 586 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1978). A nonprofit corpora-
tion sought to enjoin construction by Exxon of an offshore loading terminal, similar to the
OS&T, until a license was obtained pursuant to the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §
1501 (1976). The district court denied the injunction and plaintiffs appealed on the grounds
that the lower court erred in ruling that the facility proposed by Exxon was not regulated by
the Act. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that plaintiff's interpretation of
the Deepwater Port Act would render provisions of the OCS Lands Act ineffective. The
court viewed its obligation as giving congressional intent its fullest expression by construing
federal statutes consistently. Since construction and operation of the facility was essential to
develop the mineral resources of the OCS, application of the Deepwater Port Act would
allow other federal agencies and state officials to frustrate Interior's objective in executing
the leases. 586 F.2d at 729. The facility was therefore outside the Deepwater Port Act and
no permit was required. Id at 732.
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or federal law, and perhaps created others for future litigation, the positive
result will be increased oil production and careful consideration of the
coastal effect of OCS activities.
Dennis M. Hughes

